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A central deficiency is the absence of a 
satisfactory underlying theory of justice 
and politics to provide a reference point 
for the proper function of government 
and legislation, and recognition that 
issues of fairness are central to real-
world policy making. This is not to say 
that the taskforce ought itself to have 
engaged in moral philosophy, but it 
certainly ought to have shown more 
awareness of the ethical dilemmas with 
which legislators must grapple, dilemmas 
requiring political judgments for which 
economic theory and cost-benefit cast 
no light. One interpretation that could 
be placed on the taskforce’s selection of 
‘principles’ is that it seeks to privilege one 
group’s views of what is ‘right’ over other, 
competing views. In democratic politics 
a range of competing views is legitimate, 
and there are good grounds for resisting 
any rewriting of the rules of the political 
process to give primacy, or advantage, to 
some of those views. The proposed bill 
looks like an attempt to do that.
The taskforce report comes with 
entirely the wrong body language if the 
intention really is to improve the quality 
and effectiveness of legislation and 
regulation in this country. The report 
starts from a prior hostility to government 
per se, a desire to rein in the extent of 
state intervention in economic and social 
matters,1 and an unqualified adoption 
of the views of strict property-rights 
adherents. Consequently, the six ‘principles’ 
around which the recommendations hang 
are strongly biased against any extension 
of government activity, and carry a 
presumption that any policy intervention 
(especially one that offends the business 
community’s sensitivities) is guilty until 
proven innocent. A heavy and essentially 
undemocratic burden of proof2 is thrust 
upon officials and ministers carrying out 
their normal duties under democratic 
mandate. The proposed procedures for 
discharging that burden of proof seem 
designed, whether intentionally or not, 
to have high transaction costs and to 
trigger repeated confrontations between 
the courts and the elected government 
of the day. Far from ‘cutting red tape’, the 
proposed bill would create a morass of 
new red tape.3 Players with deep enough 
pockets to afford high-powered lawyers 
would be able to use the measure to 
obstruct government attempts to regulate 
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Introduction
The taskforce on the Regulatory Responsibility Bill has put forward what it considers to be 
six ‘broadly accepted principles of good legislation’. I shall argue, from the standpoint of 
an economist, against this description. In their present form, several of the principles have 
extreme implications for policy; and some fundamental requirements of good legislation are 
missing entirely from the taskforce’s list, and apparently will have to be defended before the 
courts every time they are implemented. 
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their activities, and this is the core of my 
concern with the bill and the report.
It is simply not true that responsible 
regulation means less or none. Responsible 
regulation means effective regulation, 
targeted tightly and effectively at people 
whose activities deserve regulation. 
Sometimes that will mean less, and 
sometimes more.
I confine my comments in this 
article to elements of just two of the 
principles: the proposition that any 
‘taking or impairment of property’ 
should be accompanied by mandatory 
full compensation, and the notion that all 
legislation must be subjected to some sort 
of prior certified cost-benefit analysis.4 
Both of these are, I suggest, likely to 
prove recipes for bad legislation and bad 
government, and I do not believe them to 
be as ‘broadly accepted’ as the taskforce 
would have us believe.
The article has a second theme, 
regarding the proper application of cost-
benefit analysis. Far too great a burden 
is placed on the notion that cost-benefit 
analysis somehow offers a means of 
resolving issues involving deep policy 
choices.5 Economists have known for 
half a century now that cost-benefit is 
an effective tool only within a restricted 
domain; that key elements of most policy 
decisions require the exercise of judgment 
on matters where economic theory is 
necessarily silent; that cost-benefit cannot 
answer ethical questions, it can only help 
identify efficient and effective ways to 
implement ethical judgments once these 
have been reached; and that ‘winners 
being able to compensate losers’ is not a 
valid test for distinguishing good policy 
from bad.
Takings, impairment and compensation
Consider the issue of transfers of income 
and wealth within the community. The 
taskforce’s principle (c) recommends 
mandatory, unqualified full compensation 
for any ‘taking or impairment’ of a property 
right when this is justified in the public 
interest. The taskforce contemplates no 
situation where ‘full compensation’ might 
not be paid. Compare this with the wording 
of the United States’ Fifth Amendment, 
which requires only ‘just compensation’ 
and includes a ‘due process’ qualifier: ‘No 
person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law, 
nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.’
The US wording leaves open the 
possibility that there can be situations 
in which justice may point to no 
compensation, or partial compensation. 
The extreme wording adopted by the 
taskforce conspicuously avoids using the 
word ‘just’, which would raise the question 
of what justice is and what it may require.
The Magna Carta was the founding 
document not only of the English 
common law and bill of rights doctrines 
regarding private property, but also of 
feudalism, a social and economic order 
that proved unsustainable because it was 
an obstacle to economic progress and 
because it embodied significant elements 
of injustice.
The Fifth Amendment to the US 
Constitution was adopted in 1789, at a 
time when slavery was considered fully 
compatible with Enlightenment thinking 
and the Magna Carta. It was more 
than half a century before slavery was 
abolished, in one of the more spectacular 
uncompensated takings of the 19th 
century. The slavery example reminds 
us that notions of what can be and what 
cannot be ‘property rights’ have evolved 
over time, as conceptions of justice have 
moved along with human progress. 
Once one abandons the idea that people 
can be the private property of others, 
the right of dispossessed slave owners to 
be compensated evaporates – because 
compensation is not required by justice. 
Justice has been a central concern 
of major economists in the past. Adam 
Smith’s list of the three duties of the 
sovereign included ‘the duty of protecting, 
as far as possible, every member of the 
society from the injustice or oppression 
of every other member of it, or the duty 
of establishing an exact administration 
of justice’ (Wealth of Nations, book 4, 
chapter 9). This included policy measures 
that would encroach on the interests of 
property and wealth. Smith, as Viner 
noted, 
saw that self-interest and competition 
were sometimes treacherous to the 
public interest they were supposed to 
serve, and … was prepared to have 
government exercise some measure 
of control over them where the need 
could be shown and the competence of 
government for the task demonstrated. 
His sympathy with the humble and the 
lowly, with the farmer and the laborer, 
was made plain for all to see. …his 
prejudices, such as they were, were 
against the powerful and the grasping, 
and it was the interests of the general 
masses that he wished above all to 
promote. (Viner, 1927, pp.231-2; see 
also Rosenberg, 1960, p.560)
Right-wing commentators and 
analysts in New Zealand have consistently 
argued over the past two decades that 
transfers of wealth or income have no 
welfare consequences – a matter I return 
to shortly – which means that their 
conception of ‘policy justified by the 
public interest’ is tightly constrained to 
policies which expand the total flow of 
goods and services available to the 
community, and does not allow for the 
possibility of net welfare gains achieved by 
uncompensated taking from the rich to 
give to the poor. So-called ‘economic 
efficiency’ thus becomes the be-all and 
end-all of legitimate policy. The narrowing 
of focus since Smith is dramatic.
To see where this narrowing of 
‘economic’ discourse leads, consider the 
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following passage from a recent paper by 
two New Zealand economists:
[T]he key political economy question 
is this: Is there a government that, 
having attained power to implement 
their agenda, would then be willing 
to impose on itself the discipline of 
weighing private costs from the taking 
of rights against an explicit assessment 
of the claimed public benefits through 
a requirement to compensate the 
private loss? This is obviously a task 
for a statesman or woman with an 
understanding of both economics 
and the law. (Evans and Quigley, 2009, 
p.33) 
The suggested ‘discipline’ would 
prohibit any policy or legislation that 
simply set out to redistribute income 
and wealth within the community, with 
no effect on output (or possibly some 
negative effect on output as measured by 
GDP). 
Let us be clear: the welfare state 
involves uncompensated taking from 
some to give to others. If all such 
taking had to be fully compensated, the 
redistribution would be nullified and the 
project aborted. If, like me, you think the 
welfare state was one of the 20th century’s 
greatest historical achievements, you will 
be worried about any extreme claim that 
all takings (not to mention ‘impairments’, 
however that is to be understood) must be 
fully compensated, for such a requirement 
would remove government at a stroke 
from the business of remedying rank 
injustice in the distribution of the benefits 
from economic activity. Precisely such an 
outcome has been, I fear, in the minds of 
some of the proponents of the Regulatory 
Responsibility Bill.
Evans and Quigley include ‘promotion 
of the welfare state’ in their list of 
‘Government interventions that result 
in uncompensated takings of property 
rights’. They acknowledge that one 
of the arguments against the sort of 
measures the taskforce recommends ‘is 
that a wider protection of property rights 
would unreasonably constrain a modern 
government in the exercise of actions 
that were in the public interest’ (Evans 
and Quigley, 2009, pp.1, 33). This indeed 
is the argument I am making here. They 
then go on, in the passage I quoted first, 
to treat the payment of actual financial 
compensation as defining the outer limit 
of good legislation. But the ability to pay 
financial compensation to those who 
lose is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for good policy. The effect of 
the Evans–Quigley test is not to control 
the quality of legislation, but to rule out 
as a matter of principle any legislation with 
redistributive effects. 
Redistribution in pursuit of social 
justice, and the prevention of re-
distribution in the opposite direction, 
is a fundamental component of good 
legislation and good government. Justice 
is not easily quantifiable, so it is not 
generally reasonable to demand, as in the 
proposed bill, that officials and ministers 
must certify (subject to court scrutiny 
on appeal) that legislation will ‘produce 
benefits that outweigh the costs’ (section 
7(j)), if by this we are to understand that 
a formal cost-benefit analysis is being 
proposed. (If not, then the certification is 
redundant red tape for purely tokenistic 
purposes.) 
Income distribution and cost-benefit
Transfers of wealth or income have 
obvious implications for social welfare. 
But cost-benefit analysis and neoclassical 
economic theory cannot illuminate those 
implications until some prior judgment 
calls have been made: firstly to enable 
different individuals’ interests to be 
weighted, aggregated and compared in 
quantitative terms; and secondly to provide 
some intelligible equivalent evaluation of 
things that are inherently unquantifiable. 
To date mainstream economic theory has 
come up with no satisfactory (‘broadly 
accepted’) way of doing either. 
Redistribution and weighting schemes
‘Pareto gains’ are changes which produce 
no losers and at least some winners. Very 
few policies in the real world meet this test. 
For evaluating the great raft of policies that 
have losers as well as winners, neoclassical 
mainstream economic theory offers only 
the very restricted Hicks–Kaldor test for 
a potential pareto gain: that the winners 
could in principle compensate the losers 
and still come out ahead. That is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for a 
policy to be a good one.
To reach any clear balance of costs and 
benefits of a policy one must start with 
some prior view about the weighting to 
be attached to the interests of the losers 
as compared with those of the winners. 
Suppose a government has been elected 
with a clear mandate to raise the incomes 
of the poor by a programme of taxes on 
the rich to fund transfers to the poor. That 
programme will probably not result in a 
pareto gain. If you think that a dollar taken 
from rich people represents a cost exactly 
equal to the benefit gained from giving a 
dollar to the poor, you would conclude 
that the policy has zero net benefit, and 
so you would not proceed. But then you 
could not honestly have stood for election 
on a redistributive programme. The 
manifesto on which the electorate voted 
will have already embodied (explicitly 
or implicitly) the prior judgment that 
a dollar transferred from rich to poor 
advances the national interest. 
In standard cost-benefit analysis 
it is usually assumed that there have 
already taken place any uncompensated 
transfers of wealth and/or income that 
may have been required to ensure that the 
requirements of justice and equity have 
been met. Only under this assumption can 
it be legitimate to array monetary costs and 
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benefits without regard to the distributive 
consequences of the proposed measure 
– ‘a dollar is a dollar’, which implies that 
all groups’ welfares are weighted equally. 
The notion that transfers are value-
neutral is sometimes elevated to dogma 
by conservative economists, is vigorously 
supported by the spokespersons of the 
rich, and has been central to some recent 
New Zealand regulatory decisions (notably 
the Commerce Commission’s notorious 
‘public benefit test’: see Bertram, 2004), 
but it lacks any foundation in economic 
theory, let alone in any theory of justice. 
It is entirely an arbitrary ad hoc device 
imported into public discourse by 
economists who in fact have nothing to 
say, professionally, about how to adjudicate 
the distributional consequences when 
there are losers as well as winners (Coase, 
1946, p.172; Williamson, 1968, pp.28-9). 
Since economists are unable themselves 
to offer any conclusive criterion for 
comparing gains and losses for different 
groups, their appropriate course of action 
is to respect whatever weighting scheme 
emerges from the political process. 
‘Efficiency’ would then be not an end in 
itself, but simply a matter of finding the 
most effective means to socially-defined 
ends. 
Those ends would include a conception 
of social justice. Rawls, for example, 
includes amongst his ‘principles of 
justice’ the idea that ‘social and economic 
inequalities … are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of 
society (the difference principle)’ (Rawls, 
2001, pp.42-3). To a Rawlsian, inequalities 
that do not satisfy this requirement 
must be eliminated before a society can 
be judged to be a just society – and in 
Rawls’ view, if a society is unjust, then 
social co-operation itself is not ultimately 
sustainable. Nozick, even in his far more 
minimalist frame of reference, similarly 
argues that restraint on the untrammelled 
exercise of property rights is necessary as 
part of a social contract to sustain society’s 
escape from ‘anarchy’ (Nozick, 1986, pp.ix, 
10-11, 178-80).
Rawls’ approach did not emerge 
simply from an exercise in pure logic. It 
embodied recognition of the historical 
fact of the 20th-century welfare state. 
The essence of the welfare state is that 
some redistribution of income and wealth 
is necessary to hold capitalism within 
the boundaries of justice. Without both 
redistribution and regulation, capitalism 
has inherent tendencies to stray outside 
those boundaries, and when it does so it 
places in jeopardy the entire project of 
social co-operation.
Because the history of economic 
thought is not widely taught or read these 
days, the point I am making here may not 
be immediately recognised, but it was one 
of the most fundamental areas of debate 
within neoclassical welfare economics 
in the mid-20th century. I return to this 
shortly.
Non-quantifiables
The existence of unquantifiables – for 
example, public goods such as trust, 
goodwill and sanctity of contracts – is 
fundamental to the successful operation 
of markets and societies. But it cannot 
be quantitatively shown that the benefits 
of the Fair Trading Act or the Consumer 
Guarantees Act outweigh their costs: 
the passing of such laws requires policy 
makers to reach the prior judgment that 
protection of the general public from 
predation by unprincipled businesspeople 
is a good thing. The same applies to the 
courts themselves, which are paid for by 
society on the basis that the rule of law is 
worth having for its own sake.
The existence of unquantifiables is 
sufficient to rule out cost-benefit analysis 
as a universal ‘principle of good legislation’. 
Whether or not cost-benefit is helpful to 
good policy making in any particular case 
is a matter of contingent circumstance, 
not constitutional principle. Cost-benefit 
analysts and economists have to renounce 
any wish to carry their analysis beyond the 
tightly-constrained limits of what their 
discipline can actually do, and to accept 
as legitimate the reasonable and informed 
judgment calls of those elected to make 
judgment calls. Elected policy makers do 
not have to answer to economists (nor to 
the courts) for their value judgments on 
matters involving the public interest.
The notion that properly formed 
judgments by elected law makers on 
matters that are unquantifiable ought to 
be subject to relitigation before the courts 
is a contradiction. If the policy maker 
has the role of making those judgments, 
then that is where the final word lies. If 
the courts have that role, then we can save 
ourselves the expense of keeping policy 
makers. At the end of the day somebody 
somewhere has to make a judgment on 
the unquantifiables before cost-benefit 
analysis can be any use at all (see Moore, 
2003, p.1220). The taskforce, it seems 
to me, wants to shift much of the job to 
the courts. Where ‘merits’ are a matter of 
political judgment, ‘appeal on the merits’ 
will inescapably impose a shift of this 
kind.
It is obviously sensible to get as good 
an estimate as possible of the costs of 
any policy, and to seek to minimise the 
cost of implementing any given policy 
judgment. But that is a long way from any 
suggestion that benefit-cost assessment 
as understood by economists can always 
precede key policy decisions.
Some history of economic thought
Utilitarian philosophers such as Bentham 
and Mill believed in the idea that welfare 
could be calculated, aggregated and 
compared across individuals. Neoclassical 
economics in the 1870s added the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility: 
as each individual’s income rises, so does 
their utility, but each additional dollar 
received gives less additional utility than 
its predecessors. This made (and makes) 
perfect sense for each individual in 
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isolation, but it presents a problem when 
we aggregate individuals into a society. If 
utility can be measured and added up, and 
if the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility holds, then unless individuals 
are very different from one another the 
welfare-maximising (optimal) distribution 
of income and wealth must be complete 
equality. Neoclassical economics thus slid, 
by the sheer force of its own internal logic 
as developed by Pigou, into a radically 
egalitarian position which subsequently 
became the basis for the welfare state 
policies of the mid-20th century.
The great intellectual achievement of 
so-called ordinalist theorists in the 1930s 
and 1940s was to persuade economists 
that their discipline could in principle 
say nothing about redistribution, which 
meant that economic theory could no 
longer be brought to bear in support 
of the welfare state. Lionel Robbins in 
1931 argued that it is not in fact possible 
to compare the utilities of individuals 
one with another and hence to compute 
a utilitarian social welfare function 
(Robbins, 1931; Backhouse, 2006). John 
Hicks tightened up the analysis in 1934: 
utility itself cannot be measured at all, so 
that economics is left only with ordinal, 
non-utilitarian analysis. It then took 
two decades more of development in 
pure theory before Ian Little and J. de 
V. Graaff in the 1950s brought out the 
logical implication: neoclassical welfare 
economics had nothing at all to say a 
priori about the optimal distribution of 
wealth and income. 
Taken on its own, this abdication 
of neoclassical economics from having 
anything to say about policy issues where no 
pareto improvement can be demonstrated 
is harmless, because it leaves policy makers 
free to exercise their judgment without 
fear of being contradicted by ‘economic 
theory’. Properly applied, the insights of 
neoclassical theory immediately rule out 
any notion of requiring legislation to pass 
in advance a cost-benefit test, because 
there is no conclusive cost-benefit test 
for any policy outside the restricted set of 
pareto-improving changes. 
Transcendental institutionalism and its critics
Rawls and Nozick, probably the two 
best-known 20th-century ‘contractarian’ 
philosophers of justice, have been jointly 
labeled ‘transcendental institutionalists’ by 
Amartya Sen (Sen, 2009). Sen’s complaint, 
directed specifically at Rawls, is that while 
Rawls lays out the requirements for a 
perfect scheme of social co-operation 
on the basis of principles of justice that 
individuals would hypothetically converge 
upon in an ‘original position’ behind a 
‘veil of ignorance’, he fails to address the 
everyday problems of relative justice that 
confront policy makers in a real world 
where injustice is prevalent. Once a just 
set of institutions has been established, it 
remains to be seen whether the individuals 
upon whose agreement the whole edifice 
rests will behave ‘reasonably’, in the sense 
of (1) acting in a way that sustains the 
institutions, and (2) refraining from doing 
things that subvert the institutions.
I think that the proposed Regulatory 
Responsibility Bill is recognisable as an 
exercise in the sort of transcendental 
institutionalism that worries Sen. It 
is a commonplace for economists to 
observe that the mere act of setting up a 
regulatory provision is apt to trigger a set 
of behavioural responses as individuals 
seek to evade or subvert the regulation 
in pursuit of their own interests. In that 
spirit I anticipate that if the Regulatory 
Responsibility Bill were passed, a range 
of behaviours would be triggered in 
response as policy makers and officials 
try to get around the restrictive and often 
counter-intuitive requirements of the 
alleged ‘principles of good legislation’; 
and as well-funded business interests use 
the courts to obstruct reasonable attempts 
to regulate their profit-taking. 
Many of the regulatory measures of 
the past two decades in New Zealand have 
fallen foul of the problem that rational 
behaviour is often ‘unreasonable’ in the 
Rawlsian sense, and that ‘reasonable’ 
behaviour in the Rawls sense is often not 
rational. I offer two quick examples.
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 
aimed to force ministers of finance 
to account fully to Parliament for all 
transactions that might affect present and 
future taxpayers, and to explain the full 
consequences of budgetary measures. It 
has left us with a policy environment in 
which politically-contentious transactions 
have simply been shifted off the Crown 
balance sheet, as fiscal policy has drifted 
towards increasing reliance on state-owned 
enterprise profits and asset revaluations, 
accounted for by separate entities over 
which ministers ostentatiously pretend 
to have little or no control and for whose 
behaviour they evade accountability. The 
emissions trading scheme, I have argued in 
a joint paper with Simon Terry, is another 
exercise in creating an off-balance-sheet 
vehicle to evade political accountability 
(Bertram and Terry, 2008, chapter 9).
Second, the regime of ‘light-handed 
regulation’ applied at the end of the 1980s 
and in the early 1990s to utility operators 
with market power – electricity, gas, 
telecommunications – was promoted 
on the basis of a transcendental-
institutionalist set of propositions about:
1 market participants behaving in a 
socially-responsible (‘reasonable’) 
manner; 
2 information disclosure providing 
customers with information that they 
could use to countervail price-gouging 
and other abuses of market power; 
and 
3 transparency encouraging good 
behaviour rather than simply 
providing a focal point for industry 
collusion. 
As I have outlined elsewhere (Bertram, 
2009), those expectations (assuming 
they were genuinely held by the policy 
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makers at the time) quickly fell foul of 
actual behaviour by corporate managers 
driven by profit and the quest for untaxed 
capital gains, in an environment where 
government took no effective steps to 
reward reasonableness or penalise rational 
but unreasonable (in the Rawlsian sense) 
action. The outcome was the failure of 
what looked at one time to be a potentially 
fruitful exercise in achieving social co-
operation in pursuit of both efficiency and 
justice. We ended up with neither – unless 
you happen to be one of those who regard 
price-gouging and uncompensated asset 
revaluations as hallmarks of ‘efficiency’. 
This was an area where effective regulation 
could have been less cumbersome, 
intrusive and wasteful of everyone’s time 
and money, if it had been designed tightly 
and enforced.
1  Page 8, para 1.2: ‘there can and should be less legislation 
…’.
2  Page 6, para B.I: ‘broadly accepted principles of good 
legislation, incompatibility with which is justified only to the 
extent that it is reasonable and can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society’. It is not stated what the 
standard of reasonableness is, nor to whom exactly and to 
what standard of proof a policy has to be ‘justified’.
3  Page 8, para 1.4: ‘statements of responsible regulatory 
management for each proposal for a new Act or regulation, 
signed off by the relevant Minister, chief executive and 
control agency…’; p.19, para 2.16 (and same point page 
20, para 2.24): ‘the potential benefit … significantly 
outweighs the additional compliance costs placed 
on the Government by the Bill’; page 19, para 2.29: 
‘the introduction of the RR Bill will raise public sector 
administrative costs …’. There is, rather conspicuously, no 
serious analysis or estimation by the taskforce of the scale of 
the costs, nor demonstration of the quantified benefits.
4  I note in Tim Smith’s article the assurance that the taskforce 
did not intend that any formal benefit-cost analysis be 
required for the purposes of certifying compliance with the 
‘principles of good legislation’, but I think that in practice this 
is exactly where we would be heading.
5  A useful review of the partisan use of cost-benefit analysis in 
the Republican campaign to subvert high-quality regulation 
in the United States from Reagan onward is in Judis, 2010. 
The New Zealand Business Roundtable has promoted similar 
practices here.
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New Zealand’s public management system was 
designed to operate in stable and predictable 
conditions. This Working Paper presents the results 
of a scan of available futures’ material to identify the 
cross-cutting challenges facing New Zealand over 
the next 20 years, and considers the ability of the 
current public management system to address those 
challenges. It identifies the powerful global forces 
that are likely to shape New Zealand’s development 
as well as the important domestic pressures. 
Looking ahead to the conditions likely during the 
21st century, the paper identifies four key 
challenges and a range of possible responses. 
From this analysis, the Working Paper identifies 
priority areas for future research, including ocean 
governance, the evolving relationship between the 
Crown and Māori, citizen-centred alternative service 
delivery, reframing the practice of policy, and 
directions for reform of the public management 
system.
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